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Visions of Legitimation in Old and New South Africa:
A Summary and Response
Stephen Ellmann*
Columbia University Law School
There is a great deal that we do not know about legitimation - including, perhaps, whether it plays any real role in societies' functioning at all.' But
we do know that governments, and would-be governments, appeal to the
governed for their support. Since we know, too, that the policies of every
government or group include gains for some and losses for others, we can
readily understand that governments and potential governments hope to present
appeals to the governed that persuade both those who profit, and those who
lose, that they should accept the institutions that produce these effects. And
so we know, as well, that when societies are changing, the various forces
competing for the power to shape the future will also compete for popular
support. The wide-ranging papers in this symposium help us to see the competing visions of legitimacy on the South African scene, and to recognize what we
know, and do not know, about the likely outcome of this competition.
The Legitimation of Discrimination
Until quite recently, the dominant vision of legitimacy in South Africa
sought to legitimize racial discrimination. Whites had won the power to rule;
as C.R.M. Dlamini indicates in his essay, they had suppressed (and continued
to suppress) blacks by force of arms. But they also claimed the right to rule.
Their claim may have rested on a combination of an assertion of the "rights"
of conquest,2 their belief in their own racial and cultural superiority,' and on
a perception of themselves as engaged in the paternalistic uplift of South Africa's blacks."
Such arguments were probably very persuasive for many years when
directed at South African whites. For a time, especially when other Western
countries themselves were practicing segregation and colonialism, South African
whites' justifications of their power may have had a receptive audience abroad
as well. Whether they held any appeal for South African blacks is a much
more puzzling question. Certainly blacks had many reasons not to be impressed by such appeals. They knew, always, that the law under which they
lived was not their own.' Many surely felt, too, that what whites called paternalism was better described as a systematic blocking of their aspirations, and
more bluntly as greed and blindness. They were well aware, in addition, that
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naked force, as well as the veiled force of the law, were constantly being deployed to keep them in line. They responded to this oppression with resistance
and struggle, again and again and in countless different areas of South African
life, over many decades - a long and painful struggle now at last tasting success.
And yet, perhaps, South African blacks did in some measure accept the
legitimacy of the oppression under which they lived. Perhaps they were
impressed by the apparatus of Western institutional and material technology;
perhaps their very vulnerability to white power encouraged a sense of dependence on whites' humane exercise of this authority;' perhaps they were daunted
by the sheer magnitude of the invaders' ultimate victory over them; perhaps
they came to doubt their own cultural and personal resources as defeat followed
defeat. Perhaps the government's efforts to coopt traditional chiefly authority
also bore fruit, either by diminishing popular respect for traditional leaders or
channeling that respect into acceptance of white rule. In short, like subordinated people in many different societies, black South Africans may have come,
through these or other mechanisms, to identify in some measure with their
oppressors. How far such sentiments went is not clear, in South Africa or in
other instances of oppression - but there are few rulers so powerful that they
rule by force alone, and South Africa is not an exception. We need to understand better whether and how unjust states can achieve legitimacy in their
victims' eyes - but fortunately we no longer need so urgently to examine this
question in the context of apartheid, because its day is passing.
Indeed, it is clear that neither force nor sentiment is any longer enough
to maintain the structure of apartheid. Instead, this structure is collapsing
almost before our eyes, much as Soviet communism has - but in South Africa,
as in East Europe and the erstwhile "Soviet Union," the shape of the future is
still to be decided, and is presently being contested. In this contest, the parties
competing to frame South Africa's future must offer visions of that future
which express the most urgent desires of their supporters, and yet offer enough
to their opponents to form a plausible basis of compromise. Not surprisingly,
therefore, these visions overlap. Moreover, there are not just two of these
visions, but rather, perhaps, as many images of the future as there are conflicting parties. Nonetheless, it is possible to sketch, with the aid of these essays,
two prominent competing perspectives.
The Legitimation of White Privilege
Let me begin with the ruling National Party, which has for some time
now assiduously sought to shed the mantle of apartheid. In its place, the
National Party seems to be offering to South Africans a new legitimation
vision, one tellingly illustrated in the essays by Dirk van Zyl Smit and Nico
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Steytler. As these essays reflect, the government's new legitimation vision has
some potent elements. Perhaps its most important feature is an absence - the
removal of the central legitimation flaw of the old order, namely its blunt,
unmistakable denial of majority rule. The new vision takes as its premise the
wrongfulness of apartheid. In its stead, the government's vision offers several
features.
First, the government now endorses a Bill of Rights, a position almost
all political groupings in South Africa have suddenly come to hold.8 Providing
judicially enforceable constitutional protections in South Africa is a wise step,
and deserves the approval of the South African people. The contents of the Bill
of Rights, however, are crucial and definitely a matter of debate. It seems very
likely that the government hopes to use this document - and its legitimating
appeal - to protect such significant rights for whites as the right to hold onto
their property and, perhaps, the right to engage in private discrimination on the
basis of race.9 Protecting whites, to be sure, is not a powerful basis for legitimation among black South Africans, but the government has repeatedly asserted
its "opposition to domination of any kind,' 0Oand this admirable, rights-minded
goal (itself an element of the government's legitimation vision, and one with
which the ANC has been able to concur") can be put to the service of insulating those with privilege from those without.
Second, the government offers the promise of neutrality. Nico Steytler
captures this theme in his discussion of the government's moves towards an
image of professionalism and nonpartisanship for the police. This image is still
far from a reality - as Steytler points out, the South African Police (SAP),
despite vehement protestations, are perceived as active and partisan participants
in the political arena; the widespread accusations of SAP's complicity in the
rampages of Inkatha [']impis' leave an indelible impression of sectarian policing.' 2 Whether or not the government wants to achieve true nonpartisanship,
however, it does seem to want a nonpartisan image. Dirk van Zyl Smit captures a similar aspiration in his reference to the government's announced
intention to run the prisons according to business principles.
Third, the government offers nondiscrimination. Many of its most
publicized reforms so far have underlined this offer, as one legislative insistence
on discrimination after another has been abruptly repealed. These papers
reflect the same development in the specific fields of prisons and police. Complete nondiscrimination is of course still very far from a reality, and it is hardly
clear how far the government is prepared to go to make good on this promise.
The promise, however, can be made in advance of, or instead of, the reality,
and the offer now being made to blacks by the government is that they can
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advance, in law enforcement and in the society as a whole, on meritocratic
grounds.
Fourth, and perhaps most important, the government promises order.
This is the central promise being made by the police, and its appeal, as Nico
Steytler emphasizes, should not be underestimated. Indeed, in a paper not
included in this symposium Jeremy Seekings has tellingly illuminated the strong4
sentiment for order among some, perhaps many, of South Africa's blacks.'
They have good reason to want order, for their lives have been horrifyingly
disrupted by its absence. The party of order - that is, whichever party can
ultimately lay claim to that label - will have a real base of support.
A Bill of Rights, professionalism, nondiscrimination, and order - these
are a potentially attractive mixture, especially when combined with the longawaited attainment of the right to vote.'" We do not know yet just how
persuasive these appeals are likely to be with the various audiences to whom
they can be directed. It remains to be seen whether the current, white government is prepared to make good on these promises, or able to appear to be
doing so; so far, the state seems much too deeply implicated in the continuing
injustice and political violence of South African life for it to carry off this
appeal easily. It also remains to be seen just how compelling the legitimation
visions offered by the African National Congress and the other extra-governmental forces become.
The National Party may hope that it can offer these features to the
electorate and actually win the first post-apartheid election. That is probably
unlikely; the taint of apartheid is too deep, and the prestige of Nelson Mandela
and the anti-apartheid movement too great. It is considerably more likely,
though, that the government and its allies will obtain a substantial measure of
popular support.'
Even in the absence of electoral success, moreover, the
government may invoke these legitimation claims in its negotiations with the
African National Congress - and in the appeals to broader South African and
international audiences that may well affect these negotiations significantly.
And although the outcome of these negotiations may turn directly on raw
political power rather than rationalizing ideology, the government's legitimation vision may well become a part of the founding framework of the new
nation and so play a part in preserving the outcome of negotiations after the
ink is dry.
But what would this appeal legitimize? Steytler suggests that the
government's strategy in the field of law enforcement is to secure continued
white control under the rubrics of professionalism and neutrality. The insistence on professionalism could locate control of the SAP within the institution
itself and under the continued guidance of the old elite. The government may
have similar aspirations for the military." So, too, the government appears
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determined to stem the rise of trade unionism within the Prisons Service, and
to reinforce a "military" ethos in prison administration.18 If whites preserve
their control over the instruments of "coercive force," Steytler argues, they will
have circumscribed the power of a post-apartheid state to invade their privileges.
Indeed, it seems entirely likely that this legitimation strategy, though
it starts from the wrongfulness of apartheid, is meant in large part to provide
the basis for legitimizing and protecting white privilege in a post-apartheid
South Africa.
This strategy, moreover, surely goes well beyond efforts to
control, or at least neutralize, the military, police and prisons. If the National
Party's negotiators are successful, they will be able to write limitations on state
power into the new nation's Bill of Rights. 9 They will also be able to enact
equally fundamental restraints in the constitutional provisions setting up the
structure of the new nation - and the Nationalists' first proposals for these
structural sections suggest just such an intent.20 The government's vision of
legitimation therefore cannot be ignored, for it may well affect the shape of the
new South Africa.
The Legitimation of Majority Rule
The opponents of apartheid, that epitome of minority rule, have long
waited for "majority rule." This could mean "black rule," pure and simple, and
there may well be many South African blacks whose anger over white oppression is so acute that they simply desire the expulsion of whites from the nation.2 But one can embrace the goal of majority rule without endorsing the
notion that the majority, however numerous, should be free to oppress the
minority - this constrained majority rule, indeed, is the standard aspiration of
liberal democratic states. As Donald Horowitz has pointed out, moreover,
there is evidence that most South African blacks (to say nothing of South
African whites) look to a future in which power is shared by all races rather
than monopolized by one.' For these blacks, as well as for South African
whites and for many foreign observers, the legitimation of majority rule must
rest on more inclusive rationales. These essays help us to identify several
elements, or potential elements, of such an anti-apartheid legitimation vision.
First, this anti-apartheid vision certainly does call for majority rule in
the sense of a government accountable to the people. Thus van Zyl Smit
envisages lay boards of visitors, outside inspectors, and direct access to prisons
by an ombudsman and the courts. Similarly, Steytler cites the ANC's call for
the police (and the military, the prison service and the civil service) to be
accountable to Parliament and to the whole community. As he notes, the
ANC calls for adequate control and supervision over these structures and an
effective machinery to investigate complaints against these services.
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The great challenge, of course, is to provide such accountability without
also generating a new partiality. This spectre of partiality is what makes
appeals to professionalism and neutrality potentially attractive, and suggests the
need for those who advocate fundamental restructuring in South Africa to offer
as well at least some measure of the orderly virtues that the government's
legitimation vision highlights. Indeed, the ANC does exactly this; the Constitutional Committee's discussion of accountability actually falls under the rubric
of "[i]mpartiality," which, the Committee explains, "presupposes a balanced
composition of the bodies concerned and a sensitivity to the needs and aspirations of all sections of the community."" The police and other services, the
ANC declares, are not "to serve the interests of any party or sectional grouping."" In the same vein, the ANC in December, 1991 concurred with the
National Party in a declaration of intent to achieve "a country free from
apartheid or any other form of discrimination or domination."2"
Second, the anti-apartheid vision promises the redress of grievances.
Where the government promises wealth, the ANC offers redistribution. Article
10 of the ANC's draft bill of rights, for example, begins with the declaration
that "[a]ll men and women have the right to enjoy basic social, educational,
economic and welfare rights."" So, too, where the government promises
meritocracy, the ANC calls for affirmative action, and in very firm tones.27
Where the government offers order, the ANC would stand for change. In the
words of another section of the draft bill of rights:
The State and all public and private bodies shall be under a duty to
prevent any form of incitement to racial, religious or linguistic hostility
and to dismantle all structures and do away with all practices that
compulsorily divide the population on grounds of race, colour, language, or creed. 8
Third, the anti-apartheid vision embraces the importance of a Bill of
Rights. Indeed, the ANC's draft bill of rights, containing as it does approximately 140 separate sections, is a far more elaborate statement of rights than the
United States Constitution contains. As we have seen, a number of these
sections deal with socioeconomic or "red" rights, while certain sections deal
with such "green" rights as the right to a healthy environment." Many other
sections, however, guarantee classic individual liberties or "blue" rights, such as
free speech, free association, freedom of religion, protection against unreasonable searches and seizures, and the presumption of innocence in criminal trials." In some respects these rights are more circumscribed than their counterparts under United States law,' but they nonetheless amount to a substantial
commitment to individual liberty and the freeing of the human spirit - the
sort of commitment that C.R.M. Dlamini's essay in this symposium evokes and
rightly endorses.
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Fourth, the anti-apartheid vision invokes the value of community. The
value of community is, of course, a rather protean one, and the shape that this
value comes to have may profoundly affect South Africa's future. As AJ.G.M.
Sanders formulates the idea of communitarianism in his essay, it rests in part
on participatory democracy - an idea reasonably compatible with both individual liberty and effective majority rule." It also entails a rejection of what
Sanders calls "groupism," which I take to be a vice particularly characteristic of
apartheid, and this rejection is surely compatible with the anti-apartheid demand for accountability, as well as with a substantial field of individual freedom. But Sanders' image of communitarianism also entails a rejection of
liberalism and of individualism. This is strong medicine for South Africa's ills,
so radical a cure that it seems likely to undercut the protection of liberty that
I have suggested is, and should be, part of the legitimating vision underlying
majority rule.
Just how strong this medicine is can be seen from the provisions of the
Banjul Charter that Sanders quotes. Article 29, for example, declares that "[t]he
individual shall . . . have the duty ....
(1) To preserve the harmonious development of the family and to work for the cohesion and respect of the family;
to respect ... his parents at all times .... ; (2) To serve his national community by placing his physical and intellectual abilities at its service; . . . . (4) To
preserve and strengthen social and national solidarity."" A responsible citizen
in a just society might well accept many of these duties - but ethical people
in imperfect societies often have good reason to resist such obligatory solidarity.
As legal rules, these requirements would profoundly diminish the options, the
freedom, of a wide variety of people: women who come to find their families
oppressive, artists who want to create art for its own sake, acerbic social critics,
and no doubt others. 4 Members of all democratic societies have potentially
burdensome duties, such as the obligation to pay taxes, but the Banjul Charter's
prescriptions, if understood as wide-ranging rules of law, would dangerously
expand the state's claims on individual citizens."
It remains to be seen whether this form of communitarian vision
becomes a central basis of an appeal for legitimation in a future South Africa.
The ANC's draft bill of rights reflects a much greater respect for individual
liberty than an unchecked communitarianism would allow, and thus suggests
that the ANC is promising South Africans individual liberty as well as majority
empowerment; those who support this more liberal vision must seek to protect
it from the inevitable storms of politics, including those resulting from the
varying sentiments that probably persist within the ANC itself. But even those
who support this latter vision (as I do) ought not to reject many of the ideals
of communitarianism. Protection of the family, of the national community,
and of social and national solidarity are desirable goals rather than dangerous
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temptations; moreover, such communitarian values may have deep roots in
African society."
Indeed, these ideals intersect with another, broader aspiration - that the
new South Africa be founded not simply on some calculating exchange of rights
and obligations among the conflicting forces within the society, but also on a
new social compact of all the races and groups of the country, and on the
forging of a new national identity. In arguing for "the development of a rights
culture," C.R.M. Dlamini identifies one valuable element of such a new nationhood. Albie Sachs, who concurs in this goal,37 speaks in even broader terms
as well, urging that the new constitution "must be rooted in South African
history and tradition. It must draw on the traditions of freedom in all communities," from Africans to Afrikaners." Moreover, he writes:
The constitution has to be for all South Africans, former oppressors and oppressed alike. It expresses the sovereignty of the whole nation, not just a part, not even just of the vast
majority. If it is to be binding on all, it should speak on behalf
of all and give its protection to all."
A new nitional identity does not require the rejection of individual
liberty, nor the elaboration of potentially burdensome legal duties of social
solidarity that the Banjul Charter's listing might suggest. It may well require,
however, the growth of a spirit that encourages individuals to accept such duties
as their own. More broadly, a focus on the goal of a new national identity
suggests that the legitimation of the legal system of a new South Africa will not
depend solely on the particular legal rules and institutions of that future society,
but more broadly on the character of the nation of which the legal system is
a part. Each of the essays in this symposium helps us to imagine that new
nation, and to begin to understand the moral, social, and legal steps between
here and there.

NOTES
*

This article is a substantially revised version of comments I made as a discussant in a

symposium on "Law and the South African Legitimacy Crisis," at the Joint Meeting of the
Law and Society Association and the Research Committee on the Sociology of Law of the
International Sociological Association, held in Amsterdam in June, 1991. I am grateful to
David 0. Friedrichs for organizing, and chairing, the panel; to my fellow panelists for their
provocative papers; and to Nancy Rosenbloom for her thoughtful reading of earlier drafts.
Columbia Law School supported my attending the conference.
1.
See generally Alan Hyde, "The Concept of Legitimation in the Sociology of Law,"
1983 Wisc. L. Rev. 379; David 0. Friedrichs, "The Concept of Legitimation and the Legal
Order: A Response to Hyde's Critique," 3 Justice Quarterly33 (1986).
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In the words of Chief Justice John Marshall, discussing American Indians' rights to the
2.
land, "[c]onquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the
private and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim
which has been successfully asserted." Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 588 (1823).
Whites may have rested this claim of superiority in part on their perception of them3.
selves as having imposed law on what otherwise would have been (in their eyes) savagery; in this
sense, the very process of ruling through legal forms offered whites a source of self-legitimation.
I discuss this form of legitimation in Stephen Ellmann, In a Time of Trouble: Law and Liberty in
South Africa's State ofEmergency 184-85 (Oxford University Press, forthcoming 1992); see also the
insightful paper (on which I draw) by Martin Chanock, "An Ecology of Coercion: Criminology,
Criminal Law and the New State. South Africa 1902-1930," unpubl., 1990.
4.
Van Zyl Smit notes in his essay the presence of notions of the "white man's burden"
in justifications for the prison system. Similarly, and as recently as 1977, a Chief Justice of South
Africa's highest court could declare that "[t]he Blacks in the white cities and towns are willingly
and often keenly taking over the White way of life" and that "[i]t is... clearly our duty to produce.., non-White lawyers and jurists into whose willing hands our legal heritage can be placed,
to be enjoyed not only in the Republic but also in the independent homelands." "Centenary of
the Transvaal Supreme Court," De Rebus Procuratoriis 393, 397 (1977) (speech of Chief Justice
Rumpf 0 .
5.
The only exception to this proposition was African customary law, but the grudging
and stultifying white recognition of customary law, described by Dlamini, seems unlikely to have
done much to reduce blacks' sense of being ruled by others.
Thus Sandra Burman has commented on nineteenth-century Christianized Africans'
6.
opposition to the use of African law to decide Africans' cases. Sandra Burman, "Symbolic
Dimensions of the Enforcement of Law," 3 (2) Brit. J. L. & Soc. 204, 210 (1976).
7.
This is the mechanism to which Douglas Hay points in his analysis of eighteenthcentury English criminal law. See Douglas Hay, "Property, Authority and the Criminal Law,"
in Douglas Hay, Peter Linebaugh, John G. Rule, E.P. Thompson, and Cal Winslow, Albion's
Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth-Century England (1975). But see John H. Langbein,
"Albion's Fatal Flaws," Past and Present 96 (Feb. 1983).
Martin Chanock emphasizes the suddenness of this transformation in his insightful
8.
essay, "A Post-Calvinist Catechism? Intersecting [N]arratives about a South African Bill of
Rights" (paper presented at the Joint Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the
Research Committee on the Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association,
Amsterdam, June 1991). On Afrikaner attitudes towards notions of human rights and the rule
of law, see also Stephen Ellmann, supra note 3, at 195-96, 200-01. On the other side of the
political spectrum, as Albie Sachs has pointed out, "South Africa must be the only country in the
world in which sections of the oppressed actually constituted an anti-Bill of Rights Committee."
Albie Sachs, ProtectingHuman Rights in a New South Africa 6 (1990).
It is possible to get intimations of the government's likely proposals from the work of
9.
the South African Law Commission, a body which in 1986 was asked by the government to
consider the question of a bill of rights. It responded in 1989 with what, at the time, was a quite
startlingly progressive report, South African Law Commission, "Working Paper 25, Project 58:
Group and Human Rights" (n.d.-1989). Among the rights it proposed to protect, however, were
the right "to establish and maintain commercial undertakings, to procure property and means of
production, to offer services against remuneration and to make a profit" (id., Article 14), "[t]he
right to private property," subject to expropriation on "payment of reasonable compensation"
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(id., art. 15), and "[t]he right of every person or group to disassociate himself or itself from other
individuals or groups: Provided that if such disassociation constitutes discrimination on the
ground of race, colour, religion, language or culture, no public or state funds shall be granted
directly or indirectly to promote the interests of the person who or group which so discriminates" (id., art. 17).
10.
South Africa's State President, EW. de Klerk, recently described "a system of 'participatory democracy'" as the "second pillar" of the National Party's constitutional proposals. Participatory democracy, he wrote, "indicates that political power shall not be vested solely in the hands
of any single individual, political party or group. We therefore proclaim our opposition to
domination of any kind." "Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy: The National
Party's framework for a new democratic South Africa" (Federal Council of the National Party,
1991) (prefatory letter to "Dear Nationalist" from EW. de Klerk). For an analysis of these
National Party proposals, see note 20 infra.
11.
For the ANC's endorsement of the goal of preventing domination in a new South
Africa, see text at note 25, and note 25, infra.
12.
Since the Amsterdam conference, fresh evidence of the government's undercover links
with Inkatha (the mass organization of Zulu leader Mangosuthu Gatsha Buthelezi) has lent even
further support to suspicions of police partisanship and complicity in violence. See, e.g., Ellen
Bartlett, "Pretoria funded 1991 Inkatha rally - Secret aid went to ANC rival after de Klerk
vowed to stop it, police say", Boston Globe, Dec. 13, 1991, at 2, col. 1.
13.
In the prison context, Dirk van Zyl Smit mentions the abolition of "the remaining
overtly racially discriminatory measures" in amendments to the prison regulations in 1990.
Meanwhile, as Steytler notes, the police will begin "the desegregation of basic training facilities"
at the start of 1992, and Adriaan VIok, then the Minister of Law and Order, "called on black
policemen 'to go all out for the top jobs in the force."
14.
Jeremy Seekings, "Visions of 'Community' in South Africa's Informal Township
Courts" (paper presented at the Joint Meeting of the Law and Society Association and the
Research Committee on the Sociology of Law of the International Sociological Association,
Amsterdam, June 1991).
15.
These essays do not focus on one other, potentially important, part of the government's
legitimation appeal - the promise of wealth, to be obtained through private enterprise. Whether
South African blacks can readily be persuaded that any of this promise will be reaped by them,
however, is not clear.
16.
Steytler mentions the government's possible aspiration to position itself as "one of the
senior partners in a 'Christian Democratic Alliance' [which] wins majority support." It might
seem incredible that the National Party could hope to obtain popular consent to its continued
power, and yet political soundings so far indicate that this hope is not entirely without foundation. There have been striking indications that the National Party is gathering support among
some "nonwhite" voters. See Christopher S. Wren, "Mandela Wants More Nonblacks in His
Group," N.Y Times, Sept. 29, 1991, at 8, col. 1 (on "Coloured" support for the National Party).
It may also be able to fashion an electoral alliance with Buthelezi's Inkatha Freedom Party, and
perhaps with some other African factions - although these alliances may have much less to do
with the legitimating vision sketched in the text than with crass political maneuver and advantage. If these various alliances do not add up to electoral victory, they might provide enough
votes to limit the new majority's freedom of action. With substantial South African aid, opponents of SWAPO were able to achieve this level of success in Namibia. See Christopher S. Wren,
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"Pretoria Spent $35 Million To Influence Namibian Vote," N.Y Times, July 26, 1991, at A3, col.
5.
Thus Dr. Jakkie Cilliers, a "defense analyst and former SADF [South African Defence
17.
Force] commandant," recently urged that the future SADF "should be subject to multi-party
control, rather than that of the government of the day." He also maintained that "the defence
force of a future South Africa would be built around the SADF as it exists today, but would
require affirmative action and changes in doctrine and practice." Gavin Evans, "Conference looks
at future role of SADF," Weekly Mail, Nov. 29 - Dec. 5, 1991, at 11, col. 1 (paraphrasing Cilliers).
18.
Van Zyl Smit discusses the government's efforts to suppress POPCRU, the Police and
Prison Officers Civil Rights Union.
19.

See text at note 9, and note 9, supra.

20.
See "Constitutional Rule in a Participatory Democracy: The National Party's framework for a democratic South Africa," supra note 10. This document reaffirms the National
Party's desire for a "new dispensation" which is, inter alia, "free from domination," id. at 1 a desirable abstraction that in practice seems largely to connote the protection of whites from the
power of a state controlled by blacks.
Among the elements of this new dispensation would be a bicameral Parliament, the
First House elected by proportional representation, but the Second produced by a system in
which seats are allocated by region and "[e]ach political party which has gained a specified
amount of support in the election in the region's legislative body will be allocated an equal
number of the seats for that region" - a system which could wildly over-represent smaller
political parties at the expense of larger ones. Id. at 11-12. The role of the Second House would
include "deliberat[ing] on and pass[ing] by a weighted majority legislation which amends the
constitution; relates to the interests of minorities; relates to the interests of regions; is entrenched
in the constitution." Id. at 12 (punctuation modified).
Another section proposes that the single State President of today's South Africa be
replaced by "a collective body known as the Presidency," to "consist of the leaders of the three
largest parties in the First House," and to make decisions by "consensus." Id. at 13. The
National Party also envisions local government elections in which "owners, lessees and ratepayers" might have special voting power, see id. at 17, and in which "neighbourhoods" could
acquire "autonomous power" over "security matters and civil protection." Id. at 17-18. This
package of proposals, undermining national authority and enhancing the voice of the privileged
in local governance, would profoundly constrain the power of future electoral majorities to enact
their programs into law. For a trenchant analysis of these proposals, to which I am indebted,
see Arthur Chaskalson, The National Party's Constitutional Proposals (Lawyers' Committee for
Civil Rights Under Law, 1991).
Donald Horowitz cites a 1986 survey in which 78 percent of Africans expressed the
21.
belief "that Whites should continue to live in a future South Africa." Horowitz properly
describes this as "an overwhelming majority," but notes that "a significant minority" took a
different view. Donald L. Horowitz, A Democratic South Africa? ConstitutionalEngineering in
a Divided Society 110 (1991).
22.

See D. Horowitz, supra note 21, at 101-02 & n.46; but cf. id. at 109-10.

23.
African National Congress Constitutional Committee, "Discussion Document: Constitutional Principles and Structures for a Democratic South Africa" 18 (African National Congress,
1991). In this vision, as Steytler suggests, "impartiality does not mean independence."
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